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The LAW RE iEw regrets to announce that it has received the resignation of Mr. William Bevis. Mr. Bevis was elected president of the
Student Editorial Board for the present year but has been forced by
illness to discontinue his services in that office.
The REviEw wishes to take this opportunity to express its appreciation for the excellent services rendered to it by Professor E. C. Luccock,
who has been its editor-in-chief for the past two years. With this issue
Professor Luccock retires and the position is resumed by Professor
Alfred Harsch who acted in this capacity from 1935 to 1937.

COMMENTS
DONEE BENEFICIARIES-DECKER V. FOWLER*
A and B contract, A promising B to render at a future date some
performance to C. What are the legal relations between A and C?
B and C?
A hundred years ago the answers to these questions would have
required consideration of something called "privity of contract" and
might well have been "no legal relations". Today, however, we can,
on the basis of many decisions, say with certainty that in most states
A owes a contract duty to C on breach of which C may have the usual
remedies of a contract obligee. 1 In now accepted terminology C is a
beneficiary of the A-B contract. The legal relations between B and C
will vary according to B's purpose in procuring A's promise. If his
purpose was to confer upon C a gratuity, C will be described as a donee
beneficiary and B is a donor of the right which C acquires against A.
If B's purpose was to have rendered to C a performance which will
discharge a duty owed by B to C, although in a sense the recipient of
a gratuity, C is usually referred to as a creditor beneficiary and for
some purposes the previously existing debtor-creditor relationship between B and C is changed to one of surety-creditor, A being regarded
as now the principal debtor.2 The following discussion will be limited
to donee beneficiaries.
As a gift, the creation in C of a right against A by the means indicated above is concededly anomalous. Where is the delivery or the
deed of gift so necessary in gifts of chattels? There is none, and by
the cases there need be none.2 This is a gift, and C is a donee simply
because C gets something for nothing-not because of any more direct
analogy to the traditional gift of chattel transaction. The "gift" here
consists not of the transfer to C of an existing legal interest owned by
B but in the making of a contract with A for a promise in terms performable to C. The "gift" is complete when the A-B contract is executed. C is a party to that contract, made so by judicial fiat creating
*In an unpublished comment concerning the legal effects of this case,
Mr. E. B. Herald of the Seattle Bar has indicated an additional problem.

He suggests that the decision has, in effect, laid a restriction upon the
constitutional power of the federal government to borrow money on the
credit of the United States. If the suggestion has merit and a federal
question is involved, the United States Supreme Court may have the last
word upon this problem.
'2 WILLISTON AND Taoivsox, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 347 et seq.;
Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 1271. The Washington decisions are to be found
in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, WASH. ANxOT. (1935)

§ 133

et seq.

'First State Bank v. Arneson, 109 Wash. 346, 186 Pac. 889 (1920); Insley
v. Webb, 122 Wash. 98, 209 Pac. 1093 (1922), 41 A. L. R. 277 (1926); Gillman
v. Purdy, 167 Wash. 659, 9 P. (2d) 1092 (1932). But cf. Continental Mut.
Sav. Bank v. Elliott, 166 Wash. 283, 6 P. (2d) 638, 81 A. L. R. 1055 (1932).
'Physical delivery of A's promise to C is of course impossible. Delivery
to C of the instrument containing A's promise has not in general been
required as a requisite to the creation in C of an enforceable right against
A. 2 WILLISTON AND THoasspsoN, CONTRACTS § 396; VANCE, INSURANcE (2d ed.
1930) p. 545.
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a rule of law which gives the donee beneficiary the status of a contract
obligee. In this analysis the concepts of delivery and surrender of
dominion have no place. Handing C the paper on which A's promise
is written can add nothing to C's position as a party to the A-B contract.
If we vary the elements of our assumed contract so that A's promise
is to pay C after B's death provided B does not during his lifetime demand performance to himself, we have merely'made C's contract right
conditional. He acquires that right only in the form and subject to
the conditions of A's promise.4 B's failure to exercise the election which
is the subject of the condition, B's death and the extinguishment thereby of the power of election which he had, creates no interest in C.
Those cases in which there is an expression of donative purpose to be
consummated in the future, which fails because. dominion over the
thing to be given was not relinquished and because the promise, being
gratuitous, is not enforceable as a contract, and not being in proper
form, is not operative as a Will, are not here in point.5
Decker v. Fowler," recently decided by our supreme court, is opposed
to these conclusions and is, we suggest, erroneous. B purchased a
government bond which provided: "The United States of America, for
value received, promises to pay to (B) payable on death to (C)." Since
the bond was redeemable by B any time after 60 days from the date of
issue, the government's promise seems to means, first "pay B if he so
requests during his lifetime" and, second, "pay C after B's death provided B does not during his lifetime demand performance to himself."
The issue presented is simply one of the rights of a donee beneficiary
under such a promise. The court, however, said:
"The question is whether (B), during his lifetime, had
made a valid gift of the proceeds of the bonds to (C) in the
event of his death Without having called for payment.
"In order to constitute a gift of personal property, one of
the things necessary is that there must be a delivery, and that
delivery must be such as will divest the donor of the present
control and dominion over the property absolutely and irrevocably, and confer upon the donee the dominion and control."
On this reasoning the court held that, although the beneficiary was.
the proper person to collect from the government, the proceeds col'2 WLLiSTON AND- THOMPsON, CoNTRAcTs § 354A; REsTATmENT, CowTRACTs (1932) § 140; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs, WASH. ANNoT. (1935) § 140.
There are a number of life insurance cases where the policy reserved to
the ifisured the power to change beneficiaries or to take the cash value
or a loan therefor, without the beneficiary's consent, and the court described the beneficiary's interest as an "expectancy" and not "vested". The
significance of such language must, however, be derived from the circumstances with regard to which it was used. These show that the beneficiary's interest is usually so described only in contests between beneficiary and insured during the latter's lifetime with regard to control "of
the policy, and in contests between a beneficiary named in the policy and
an alleged substitute beneficiary. Toole v. National Life Ins. Co., 169
Wash. 627, 14 P. (2d) 468 (1932); VAxcE, INsURANCz (2d ed. 1930) p. 559
et seq.

5See note 10, infra.

'99 Wash. Dec. 485, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939).
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lected must be surrendered to B's estate. Four cases were cited in support of the decision. Three are not in point. 7 The fourth involved analogous facts and reached a similar result on a similar basis.8
In acknowledging that the beneficiary was by the contract given the
right, and the sole right, to enforce payment after B's death, the court
in effect acknowledged that the beneficiary's cause of action arose out
of the contract and that B had done whatever had to be done to perfect it. The next step, holding that the money belonged to B's estate
because dominion was not surrendered during B's lifetime, is inconsistent. The government held no money in trust for B. It was a borrower.
The money paid to it was a loan. It made a promise to pay, became
a contract obligor and nothing more. Apparently, under this decision,
to accomplish his purpose B would have to surrender to C dominion
over the written evidence of A's promise-a promise which was by its
terms performable to C. This would complicate exercise by B of his
own rights under the contract. In so holding the court ignored the
,In re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204 (1915); In re McCoy's
Estate, 189 Wash. 103, 63 P. (2d) 522 (1937); Shaw v. Camp, 160 Ill. 425,
43 N. E. 608 (1896). The first involves choses in action (stock certificates
and promissory notes) and failure of the alleged gift because the donor
had not surrendered dominion thereof. The second involves an attempt
to make a gift by issuance of stock certificates in a personal holding
company in the name of the children of the corporation's owner, the
latter retaining the certificates in his possession and continuing to exercise
complete control over corporate affairs. The third case involved a promissory note payable at the maker's death, executed without consideration
and with the purpose of conferring a gratuity upon the payee. Enforcement was denied for lack of consideration. The Washington court said
in citing this case: "It may be that the analogy between that case and the
one before us is not complete, but to this extent there is an analogy. In
that case the promise to pay was evidenced by a promissory note. In
this case, the promise to pay was evidenced by a bond." (sic.)
'Hicks v. Meadows, 193 Ala. 246, 69 So. 432 (1915). That the Alabama
court mistakenly regarded the problem before it as an attempted gift of
money appears both in its opinion and in its later cases. Sudduth v. Holloway, 212 Ala. 24, 101 So. 733 (1924); Davis v. Wachter, 224 Ala. 306, 140
So. 361 (1932). There is some other support for the position that a certificate of deposit taken by B in C's name is ineffective to create any interest
in C where the certificate is not delivered to C. Telford v. Patton, 144
Ill. 611, 33 N. E. 1119 (1892); Lindner & Boyden Bank v. Wardrop, 370
Ill. 310, 18 N. E. (2d) 897 (1938); Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148
S. E. 229 (1929); Nannie v. Pollard, 205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933).
These cases assume, erroneously, that the subject of the gift is the certificate itself. Cf. the joint savings account cases, 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 47. Cf. also the joint checking account cases, 5 MIcHIE, BANKS
AND BANKING (1932) c. 9, § 46, and Myers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac.
1003 (1913), where the principal issue properly is the existence of a gift
purpose in the depositor. In the Meyers case, however, we find the court
again concerned with the transfer of dominion: "The subject matter of
the gift, if there were a gift, was the right to withdraw or recover the
money on deposit with the bank. In order to constitute a gift, it is
necessary that there be a delivery, actual, constructive or symbolical,
which will pass the dominion and control of the subject-matter from the
donor to the donee." See also Compton v. Westerman, 150 Wash. 391, 273
Pac. 524 (1928) (promissory note, separate writing relieving maker of
duty to pay should payee die before the note was paid: held, that this
writing controlled).
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Judges Steinert and Robinson recognized the case as involving a
donee beneficiary and joined in a well-written dissent which concludes:
"The result of the majority opinion will be that what heretofore has
been thought to be an attractive form of government security will
prove but a snare to those who rely upon it." The rule of the case
will do more than defeat the purpose of those who purchase this type
of bond. It strikes at every life insurance policy which contains the
now usual clauses reserving to the insured the power to effect a change
of beneficiary or realize the cash value of the policy, without consent
of the named beneficiary.

WARREN L. SHATTUCK.

EXEMPTIONS OF REMAINDER INTERESTS IN THE INHERITANCE TAX STATUTE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Three recent cases involving the application of the inheritance tax
statute of the State of Washington have raised some problems which
should receive immediate attention.' The statute provides three different schedules of rates, the schedule applicable to any gift being determined by the relationship of the beneficiary to the deceased.' Class A
includes any devise, bequest, legacy, gift or beneficial interest to any
property or income therefrom which shall pass to or for the use or benefit of any grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, husband, wife,
child or stepchild, or any lineal descendant of the deceased. The schedule of rates for class A provides for a tax of 1 per cent on amounts
from $10,000 to $25,000; of 2 per cent on amounts from $25,000 to
$50,000, and of higher rates for larger amounts. Class B includes gifts
to a brother or sister. The schedule of rates for class B begins with a
tax of 3 per cent on amounts from $1,000 to $5,000, 4 per cent on
amounts from $5,000 to $10,000, and continues at an increasing rate
for larger amounts. Class C includes gifts to all others. The schedule
of rates for class C begins with a tax of 10 per cent on all amounts
up to $10,000, 15 per cent on amounts from $10,000 to $25,000, and
continues at an increasing rate for larger amounts. The classification
set up by the statute is inclusive in that it covers all possible gifts to
all persons. The statute provides for appraisement of property subject
'VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3; 1 BOGERT and 5 MIcHIE, op. cit. supra note 8.
'"The Washington court made no mention of the possibility that the
transaction before it might be controlled by the Statute of Wills and In
re Murphy's Estate, 193 Wash. 400, 75 P. (2d) 916 (1938), rehearingdenied,
195 Wash. 695, 81 P. (2d) 779 (1938). Several unsuccessful attempts have
been made to induce application of that statute to life insurance contracts
in which the beneficiary's interest was not absolute. Martin v. Modern
Woodmen, 253 111L
400, 97 N. E. 693 (1912); Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. Rep.
641, 137 N. Y. S. 243 (Sup. Ct. 1912). It would appear equally inapplicable
to the contract in issue in Decker v. Fowler, 99 Wash. Dec. 485, 92 P. (2d)
2541 (1939).
In re Gochnour's Estate, 192 Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027 (1937); In re
Hallstrom's Estate, 98 Wash. Dec. 193, 88 P. (2d) 405 (1939); In re Bostad's
Estate, 100 Wash. Dec. 25, 93 P. (2d) 726 (1939).
2Rmw. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11202.

